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Abstract
This article is focused on public interpretations of the Argentine “crisis” at the begin-
ning of the twenty-fi rst century as necessary conditions for the constitution of the 
event. Such interpretations held that Argentina was dominated by a kind of evil force 
originated a long time ago, but whose eﬀ ects persisted in the present. And, unless 
it was conjured once and for all, it would remain active and damaging in the future. 
Thus, the “crisis” was seen as an episode of the continuous failures. Based on opinion 
pieces or leading articles in newspapers and general interest and political magazines, 
academic articles and books, I want to show how the imagination of possible futures 
depended on the conceptions of temporalities implicit in the interpretations embed-
ded in narratives and diﬀ erent valuations of events, fi gures and ideas. These gave his-
torical specifi city to the event and led to the emergence of new scenarios for political 
action.
Keywords: Argentine crisis; narrative; temporality; public interpretations.
Resumo
O propósito deste artigo é mostrar como as interpretações públicas da “crise” argen-
tina no início do século XXI foram condições necessárias para a constituição do 
evento. Tais interpretações sustentavam que a Argentina era dominada por uma espé-
cie de força maligna originada há muito tempo, mas cujos efeitos persistiram no pre-
sente. E, a menos que ela fosse conjurada de uma vez por todas, permaneceria ativa e 
prejudicial no futuro. Assim, a “crise” foi vista como um episódio do fracasso contínuo 
da nação. Com base em colunas de opinião ou editoriais em jornais e revistas de inter-
esse geral e político, artigos acadêmicos e livros, quero mostrar como a imaginação de 
futuros possíveis dependia das concepções de temporalidades implícitas nas inter-
pretações expressas em narrativas e diferentes avaliações de eventos, personagens 
e ideias. Estes deram especifi cidade histórica ao evento e levaram ao surgimento de 
novos cenários para a ação política.
Palavras-chave: crise argentina; narrativa; temporalidade; interpretações públicas.
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Introduction1
At the beginning of 2003, Daniel Dessein, a prominent journalist, published 
the book Reinventar la Argentina. Refl exiones sobre la crisis. The book gathered 
several short articles, written by journalists, writers, historians, lawyers, politi-
cal scientists, philosophers, art critics, sociologists and economists. Their goal 
was to think about the time they were living as a “crisis”, which became de 
most prominent way of naming. In the foreword, Dessein argued that the cen-
tral purpose of the volume was to answer fundamental questions in order to 
understand the present “crisis”. These questions were: When did the country 
lose its “golden destiny”? What have been the causes of the “fall”? How respon-
sible were the “politicians, economists, journalists, educators, intellectuals and 
citizens in general”? Were the Argentines “victims of a strange disease” or a 
kind of “fi erce dialectic from which [they could not] escape”? The answer to 
these questions, then, was essential in order to know the destiny of Argentina, 
to glimpse a future (Dessein, 2003, p. 7-8).
Since the fi rst weeks of December 2001 and even before, a vast amount 
of refl ections like these circulated in the media and in publications such as 
academic articles and books; some of the latter became authentic best sellers 
(Fiorucci, 2004). They were written by economists and political scientists, but 
also other social scientists, historians, philosophers, artists, journalists and 
writers, all driven by the desire to elucidate the causes of the current situation 
and eager to propose possible solutions. Some of them were regular contributors 
1 This article is the result of research carried out in the course of several projects fi nanced by 
various institutions. My thanks especially to The Netherlands Organisation for Scientifi c 
Research (NOW, 2004-2006), the Universidad de Buenos Aires (2004-2007) and Fondo para la 
Investigación Científi ca y Tecnológica (FonCyT), Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científi ca y 
Tecnológica (ANPCyT), Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación Productiva (2004-2007). 
Diﬀ erent previous versions have been presented and discussed in various scientifi c events; the 
fi rst versions were written in collaboration with Patricia Vargas, who carried out a deep and 
fundamental documentary research. I am very grateful to Vargas, Claudio Lomnitz-Adler, Fed-
erico Neiburg, Antonius Robben, Ruben George Oliven, Mariano Plotkin, Rosana Guber, Eze-
quiel Adamovsky, Enrique Garguin, Diego Zenobi, Ricardo Fava (†), Alejandro Blanco, Moises 
Kopper, Sabina Frederic, David Parker, Daniel Ozarow, Susann Baez Ullberg, Jonathan Ablard, 
Sandra Gayol, Lorenzo Cañás Bottos, Gabriel Gatti, Julieta Quirós, Claudia Stern, Alejandro 
Castillejo-Cuéllar, Gabriela Mattina and Julieta Lenarduzzi for their criticism and suggestions. 
All translations of sources from Spanish to English are mine.
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in newspapers, magazines and radio and television programs; others were 
regarded as public and ethically upright fi gures. In those days, the Argentines 
were suﬀ ering a deep economic and fi nancial collapse, massive unemployment 
and poverty, intense social protest and a lack of confi dence in government 
institutions and in political leadership. The authors of the aforementioned 
writings agreed that although Argentina had experienced similar episodes in 
the past, the situation was the most terrible and profound in Argentine history.
According to the indicated texts, this “crisis” had immediate political and 
economic causes and its overcoming demanded urgent measures; however, 
from their perspective this explanation was insuﬀ icient: the “crisis” was not 
only economic and political, but “moral”. Its ostensible manifestation was 
widespread corruption, especially concerning politicians. Evoking Mary Doug-
las (1966), Argentina was seen in these writings as a “dirty” and “impure” nation 
that needed urgent “purifi cation”. At the same time, these texts held that the 
causes that generated the current situation were not recent, but they came from 
the past and were active today. As essayist Juan José Sebreli (2004, p. 9) said:
The current collapse is not only the result of those responsible for the last mistakes; 
it is the inevitable consequence of years of accumulation of mistakes, crimes and 
ephemeral illusions. Its origins, the roots of evil, the serpent’s egg, must be sought 
further and deeper, we must trace back the tortuous path that led us to the abyss.
Like Dessein, Sebreli and other interpreters of the presently called “crisis” shared 
the idea that Argentina was continually failing, making the same mistakes 
again and again, constantly moving from hope to frustration. In this sense, the 
current “crisis” was just one episode in a long history of failures; therefore, the 
roots of the evils of the present had to be sought through an inquiry of the past.
Usually, the notion of crisis is associated with discontinuity: something 
happens and puts an end to what existed so far. From the perspective of the 
medical conception in which this notion was originated, a crisis is a turning 
point because when it breaks out, it is impossible to know the outcome of a 
situation, i.e., if a patient will improve or worsen (Habermas, 1976; Holton, 1987; 
Koselleck, 1988). It is a temporary disruption in which the future does not appear 
as the predictable result of the continuity between past and present, so time 
is perceived as stagnant: something is no longer what it used to be, but it has 
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not yet become what it is meant to be (Visacovsky, 2011b, 2017). The idea of crisis 
implies the inability to envision the future and it is, therefore, a time that can 
only be lived as uncertain (Koselleck, 1988); that is what Claudio Lomnitz-Adler 
(2003, p. 132) calls a present saturation, i.e., a collective aversion to socialize viable 
and desirable future images, close to the idea of frozen time (Visacovsky, 2017) and 
the classic liminality (Horvath; Thomassen; Wydra, 2015). Those undergoing the 
time of crisis cannot know how or when it will end, but they can still imagine 
possible outcomes; and in doing so, they forge possible solutions and scenarios 
for political action. How can the future be imagined under these circumstances? 
The most recent analyses on the fi nancial crisis of 2007-2008 or the Greek debt 
crisis have shown the importance of the interpretations about the past for the 
recreation of the future (Bryant, 2016; Goddard, 2014; Knight, 2012a, 2012b, 2016, 
2017; Knight; Stewart, 2016; Roitman, 2014). These interpretations embedded in 
narratives constitute a symbolic precondition for the organization of present 
experiences. A new future has to be designed and imposed on society, both by 
way of a consensus as well as by disputing other possible futures (Visacovsky, 
2017). In parallel, the same perception of the crisis as a public and general issue 
must be imposed, as a critique (critique and crisis are related terms, see Koselleck, 
1988; Roitman, 2014) of the current interpretation of a political project embodied 
in the state (Hay, 1996).2 The genesis of a perception of the future as uncertain is 
closely linked to the possibility of damaging trust in a hopeful future. In this way, 
any crisis can be seen as an attack on a certain political orientation, cutting oﬀ  
its idea of the future and, in short, replacing it with a new one.
Most studies about the so-called “Argentine crisis” were focused on its 
economic and political causes (Levey; Ozarow; Wylde, 2014). With the excep-
tion of few works (Armony, 2004; Armony; Armony, 2005; Goddard, 2006), less 
attention has been paid to the public interpretations of the situation. It is fool-
ish to ignore the importance of the eﬀ ects of economic policies on the lives of 
human populations. However, what I want to show here is the relevance of 
public interpretations of the situation as necessary conditions for the confor-
mation of the “crisis” as an event (Hay, 1995, 1996; Kapferer, 2010; Sahlins, 1985; 
2 As Colin Hay (1996) has shown in the case of the rise of Thatcherism in Great Britain in the mid-
1970s, the crisis must be narratively constructed as a diagnosis of the situation and a form of 
and a decisive intervention aimed at transforming the state.
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Turner, 1974). As I will show, during the time of “crisis” in Argentina the cur-
rent situation was seen as an episode of the continuous failures of the country; 
therefore, far from being something unexpected, the current “crisis” was seen as 
a foreseeable event. As we saw in the cases of Dessein and Sebreli, the reasons 
for the continuous failures went back to the past. Such interpretations held 
that Argentina was dominated by a kind of evil force originated a long time ago, 
but whose eﬀ ects persisted in the present. And, unless it was conjured once 
and for all, it would remain active and damaging in the future.
My study is based mainly on opinion pieces or leading articles in newspa-
pers and general interest and political magazines; academic articles and books 
published mainly between the beginning of December 2001 and 2004, when 
the publication of these texts became increasingly discontinuous. I tackled 
these texts as narratives, focusing especially on: a) the characterization of the 
situation and its terminology; b) the reasons or causes that explain the situa-
tion as an object (crisis); c) the reasons or historical causes of the ills of Argen-
tina; d) the temporal / chronological origins of the evils; e) the agents of evil 
(ideologies, political parties, political leaders); f) the connection of the present 
with the past or the way in which the evils of the present go back to the past 
(genealogies); g) the implicit time frame; h) the implicit or explicit resolution 
of the situation, the images of the future. Through this analysis, I identifi ed 
three main narratives: “the Argentine decline”, “the adolescent nation” and “the 
recurrent cycles”. These are general plot schemes that diﬀ er in their implicit 
conceptions of temporality, under which lay distinctive versions of the national 
history. They are dissimilar in the way they assess events, fi gures and ideas (i.e. 
when the decline began and who was responsible for it). I want to show how 
the conceptions of temporality and the diﬀ erent valuation of events, charac-
ters and ideas were the conditions of possibility for the postulation of potential 
futures. On the one hand, the future could be imagined as the restoration of a 
promissory past, the passage from adolescent liminality to a state of adulthood, 
or the displacement of the present to the past and their constant vigilance. On 
the other, the moral evaluation allowed to postulate genealogical relations 
between events, characters and ideas of the present and the past (Valeri, 1990), 
diﬀ erentiating “virtuous” from “malignant”, morally acceptable from inaccept-
able relations (Visacovsky, 2002, 2011a). This gave historical specifi city to the 
event and led to the emergence of new scenarios for political action.
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“La crisis”: its names and chronology
The situation that erupted in December 2001 was the result of a long process 
that had begun much earlier. During the 1990s, economic policies were based 
on fi scal adjustment, foreign exchange liberalization, an open economy, bank-
ing deregulation, reduction of the role of the state; this caused the bankruptcy 
of private companies, the disappearance of state enterprises and the conse-
quent growth of the informal sector and the increase of unemployment and 
poverty. The data showing that in September 2001 14 million out of the coun-
try’s total population of 37 million (38 per cent) lived under the poverty line 
(Lozano, 2001), cannot be understood in the short term. From 1991 to 2000, in 
Gran Buenos Aires the unemployment rate rose from 6 to 17.9 per cent (Kes-
sler; Di Virgilio, 2008). In May 2002, the national unemployment rate reached 
a record 21.5 per cent, meaning that the number of unemployed people rose to 
2.8 million; meanwhile, precarious employment reached 56.9 per cent of the 
employed population and salaries were cut sharply. After the economic mea-
sures of January 2002, the population living below the poverty line increased 
signifi cantly: 53 per cent of Argentines (19 million people). And nearly one-
fourth lived in misery (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, 2002). Cer-
tainly, the situation was extremely serious; in consequence, the new national 
authorities had to develop emergency measures to address these problems, par-
ticularly the urgencies of the neediest sectors (Heymann, 2006; Kosacoﬀ , 2007).
On December 3, 2001 the government of the “Alianza para el Trabajo, la Jus-
ticia y la Educación” (“la Alianza”) imposed severe restrictions on individual 
bank accounts (informally called corralito) under the pretext of preventing 
capital fl ight. Subsequently, on December 19 mass protests erupted, espe-
cially in the city of Buenos Aires: the famous cacerolazos, in which protesters, 
identifi ed by the media as “middle class” (Visacovsky, 2009), expressed their 
anger by banging pots and pans and making a lot of noise. At the same time,
on the outskirts of the city of Buenos Aires, impoverished sectors of the popula-
tion ransacked supermarkets and other shops. Protests continued on Decem-
ber 20, ending in a bloody police repression at Plaza de Mayo and in other 
places, adding up to thirty-nine deaths across the country. This episode trig-
gered the resignation of the entire executive branch, whose president was Fer-
nando de la Rúa. After a brief period in which three presidents succeeded each 
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other, on January 2, 2002 the Legislative Assembly elected Peronist Senator 
Eduardo Duhalde as president. The new administration decreed the end of the 
Convertibility Law, which had been in force since April 1st, 1991.3 However, 
the critical situation continued during the following months, with high levels 
of public unrest (Camarasa, 2002; Jozami, 2003), even after Néstor Kirchner 
became president on May 25, 2003 (Giarraca, 2007). What this chain of events 
highlights is a political and economic order being disintegrated and leading to 
a new one. The “Argentine crisis” has often been presented with a supposedly 
accurate and indisputable chronology. However, as outlined below, identifying 
the “crisis” as a precise event is extremely diﬀ icult. Although economic and 
fi nancial measures seem to be a reliable and objective instrument, the “crisis” 
was a much more ambiguous event from the point of view of social experiences.
During the aforementioned period, the word “crisis” was uttered by a num-
ber of experts as well as politicians, academics, artists and journalists, and 
propagated through mass media. This dominant term was accompanied or 
replaced by others such as “fall”, “collapse”, “crash” or “demolition”. In many 
occasions, the term “crisis” was swapped for notions such as “earthquake” or 
“disaster”. The situation was also conceived as “falling down a well”; therefore, 
some interpreters, as Abadi and Mileo (2002) and Altamirano (2002) agreed 
that “the Argentines had hit rock bottom”. Diﬀ erent social actors frequently 
resorted to a medical analogy: as if the country was a patient in a serious and 
irreversible condition and whose death was clearly very close, “the crisis” was 
typifi ed as “terminal” (see, e.g. Dessein, 2003, p. 7-8). Subsequently, other names 
were coined. Some leftist political groups defi ned the situation as Argentinazo 
especially pondering social protests (see Gordillo, 2012; Bonasso, 2001). In a 
similar sense, the state of aﬀ airs was defi ned as a “revolt”, “rebellion”, “revo-
lution” or “explosion”, expressions which were often accompanied by an 
adjective: “popular” (Dinerstein, 2003; Fradkin, 2005; Iñigo Carrera; Cotarelo, 
2006; Pereyra, 2003). This conjuncture was also called “Tragic December”, 
because the accent was put on repression. Nevertheless, here I want to focus 
3 This law had been imposed by Carlos Menem’s Peronist government; its purpose was to establish 
a fi xed exchange rate between the national currency and the US dollar at the rate of 1 US dollar 
per 10,000 Australes (the legal currency in Argentina since 1985), that was later replaced by a 
new currency, the Peso Convertible, whose value was equal to 1 US Dollar from January 1, 1992.
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on the term “crisis”, since it was the most customary label. As I will explain later, 
the situation was almost unanimously perceived as the end of an era or cycle.
However, there were many discrepancies regarding the identity and nature 
of the age that was ending. The prevailing interpretation stated that the “crisis” 
was the consequence of neoliberal policies of the 1990s and legitimacy prob-
lems at the beginning of the new century (Epstein; Pion-Berlin, 2006; Novaro, 
2002; Ollier, 2003; Pírez, 2002; Rapoport, 2004; Teubal, 2004); as a conse-
quence, these interpreters argued that what had concluded (or had to conclude) 
was the “neoliberal” era or cycle. Although this period was associated with 
Menem’s government, some interpreters traced its origin back to the last dicta-
torship in 1976: thus, a genealogical relationship between Menemism and dic-
tatorship was established. As I will show in the next section, many also agreed 
that a style of “politics” that had begun in 1983 with the return of democracy 
had ended; it had been characterized by corruption, unfulfi lled electoral prom-
ises and political behind-the-scenes decision-making.
When did the situation begin to be labeled as a “crisis”? From December 3 
(when the corralito was imposed) news stories from major newspapers agreed 
to set the scene as a “crisis”. Nevertheless, the situation had already been cat-
egorized as such several months before. In December 2000, La Nación added a 
new section entitled “The lessons of the Argentine crisis. A series on the basic 
problems”. Here opinion pieces written by prominent scientists, philosophers, 
writers and businessmen were published, which held that Argentina was fro-
zen in time. To escape from this prison of the present, the country had to learn 
from the past, as well as other nations had done. Likewise, dreams and utopias 
were indispensable (Las enseñanzas…, 2000). These personalities stressed the 
need to build that new Argentina, the nation that did not exist.
After the events of late 2001, the onset of the “crisis” was increasingly con-
fi ned to December, particularly 19 and 20. Most of the articles in the news and 
other writings considered that the “crisis” continued during the months follow-
ing December 2001, after the commencement of Duhalde’s presidency, even until 
after Kirchner took oﬀ ice as president on May 25, 2003. Kirchner himself said the 
“crisis” persisted throughout his presidency. From the beginning, he compared the 
ways to overcome the “crisis” with the passage of the souls of the dead from Hell 
to Paradise: they had to pass through the purifi cation of Purgatory. Indeed, Kirch-
ner said that his main goal was to get out of Hell in order to get to Purgatory, and 
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in many occasions he stated: “we are still in Purgatory” (Bleta, 2006; Cufré, 2003; 
Kirchner le resta…, 2007; Kirchner prometió…, 2003; Kirchner volvió…, 2006; No 
anticipan…, 2006; Pérez de Eulate, 2007). A few months after the national presi-
dential and legislative elections on October 28, 2007, this image enshrined the 
idea of an Argentina which was still living in a time of crisis; however, it was no 
longer paralyzed. That was the good news: a new time would soon ensue.
A polluted nation
The Alianza, the political coalition that the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) and 
the Frente País Solidario (Frepaso) founded in 1997, triumphed in the elections 
of October 24, 1999, making de la Rúa president and Carlos “Chacho” Álvarez 
vice president. From the beginning, the Alianza sought to establish itself as an 
alternative force to Menemism. It characterized Menem’s administration as the 
epitome of corruption (Astarita, 2014; Corral, 2014; Mauro, 2012); however, when 
the Alianza came to power its moral discourse was severely damaged due to a 
bribery scandal in the National Senate regarding the approval of a labor law 
reform. As a result, “Chacho” Álvarez resigned in early October 2000 (Juri, 2000).
Days before the legislative elections held on October 15, 2001 many citizens 
expressed their detachment and apathy towards the election. Mass media con-
stantly disseminated the opinions of citizens who were disillusioned with the 
Alianza. Of course, not all the population had this attitude; it is likely that the 
media contributed to this situation. Anyway, this state of public opinion was 
refl ected in the elections, which severely questioned the political leadership 
by a protest vote.4
In the midst of the “crisis”, large segments of the population tried to explain 
the new circumstances through the behavior of politicians. They were considered 
4 In these elections, 9.4 per cent of the voters did not choose any candidate (protest vote), reach-
ing its highest level in 20 years (voting is mandatory in Argentina for all citizens between 18 and 
70 years old); and 9 per cent of the votes were considered invalid according to the electoral laws 
(spoilt vote) (Blanquer; Cheresky, 2003; Escolar et al., 2002). After de la Rúa’s resignation, the 
interpretation of disappointment and frustration at unfulfi lled promises of the Alianza’s gov-
ernment became an explanation of the debacle, especially considering the fury of the middle 
class (O’Donnell, 2001; Savoia, 2002).
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primarily responsible for having led the country into a desperate situation. Dur-
ing public protests people sang “que se vayan todos, que no quede ni uno solo” 
(“all of them must go, none of them should stay”), revealing the bitterness and 
hatred against political leaders. The governments of Menem, de la Rúa, Duhalde, 
and even Kirchner in his fi rst years, as well as banks, judges and politicians in 
general were considered responsible for the debacle, blamed and characterized 
as corrupts, chorros (thieves) and mafi osi. Even some government oﬀ icials, gover-
nors, legislators and judges were pursued and physically attacked in the streets. 
Politicians were seen as ambitious and greedy, villains (see, e.g. Kovadloﬀ , 2002), 
astute beings that possessed the ability to seduce citizens with promises that 
would not be fulfi lled later, when they became incumbents. In turn, politics was 
perceived as a dishonest way of life; hence, politicians were considered evil.
But this was not the only accusation. Indeed, others were also perceived as 
incompetent, allegedly because of their poor training for political leadership 
and their lack of conviction, courage and patriotism. In some cases, they were 
directly labelled as foolish. This was the case of de la Rúa, who had been deeply 
denigrated before his resignation. Mass media constructed an image of the pres-
ident as stupid; he was constantly mocked. A few days before his resignation, 
some of his public appearances were heavily ridiculed and even some tried to 
attack him physically (Balmaceda, 2001). On several occasions, he was defi ned 
as “autistic” and “good-for-nothing”. Philosopher and writer José Pablo Fein-
mann (2001) wrote: “[de la Rúa] was baptized Louis XXXII by the popular humor, 
because he was twice as boludo [dumb] as Luis XVI”. He called him “Isabelito” (a 
diminutive of Isabel, the nickname of María Estela Martínez de Perón (“Isabe-
lita”), third wife of Perón and president of Argentina after his death in 1974, who 
had been overthrown by the military coup of March 24, 1976) because of a simi-
lar inability and incompetence to govern. Such a comparison was strengthened 
with the pictures of the helicopters in which both left the Casa Rosada.
Corruption as a moral problem was considered to be the main cause of all 
evil. Argentina was “a society in a state of serious moral decomposition”, as 
the journalist Sylvina Walger (2001) aﬀ irmed. Or as writer Mempo Giardinelli 
(2001) emphatically stated: “the problem of Argentina is not economic […] it is 
political and above all moral […]”. Corruption was analogous to an illness that 
corroded morals and broke up social cohesion; Argentina could be seen as a 
country that was crumbling, routing to its dissolution. The image of a “republic 
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ravaged by corruption and misgovernment” would even be invoked by Duhalde 
in his speech to the Legislature when he took over as president on January 2, 
2002. Very often, corruption was described through body metaphors. These 
allowed interpreters to refer to the nation as a sick body, simultaneously with 
odors from its secretions or stool and widespread putrefaction. Thus, anyone 
could sense the “rotten smell”, as writer and journalist Osvaldo Bayer (2002a) 
pointed out. Eschatological allusions were also frequent; corruption was like 
fecal matter falling on society; as Giardinelli (2002) said: “Those at the top 
defecate over those below”. Those at the top were not just politicians; he also 
included managers, supervisors, entrepreneurs, all responsible for enslaving 
workers.
Very soon some interpreters postulated the existence of an alleged essence 
or nature of the Argentine people. Books like Argentinos, by journalist Jorge 
Lanata (2002, 2003) and Los mitos de la historia argentina, by history professor 
Felipe Pigna (2004) became best-sellers. Both posed a similar line of interpre-
tation: on the one hand, there was an “oﬀ icial history” full of lies and conceal-
ments; on the other, a “true history” that had been “hidden” and needed to 
be revealed to the people. Despite their diﬀ erences, both authors argued that 
Argentina had been a corrupt country since the Spanish conquerors set foot on 
this land in the sixteenth century (even though the Argentine nation did not 
exist yet); therefore, the current infected period was the continuation of a cor-
rupt past, a past in which only some historical public fi gures considered unpol-
luted could be vindicated (Apaza, 2008; Carlos, 2005; De Amézola; Carnevale; 
González, 2009).
Nevertheless, as I argued, the decisive issue was to diagnose the evil that 
aﬀ licted Argentina from the depths of history. As we will see below, these inter-
preters shared deep-seated beliefs about the causes of the nation’s ills beyond 
ideological and political diﬀ erences.
The narratives of national history and the intelligibility 
of the “crisis”
Apparently, there is nothing new under the sun regarding the traumatic process 
of Argentine decline and instability of the last twenty-fi ve years, during which 
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failures, tragedies and also fantasies of hope – later revoked – of a country presum-
ably condemned to unlimited prosperity have proliferated. (Schutt, 2003, p. 475).
This was the way sociologist and political scientist Daniel Schutt described 
the “crisis” as a manifestation of the long decline of a country that supposedly 
should have achieved prosperity. Sebreli (2004, p. 13) also shared the idea that 
the “crisis” was the manifestation of a long decline, but at the same time argued 
that the reasons were mysterious:
The Argentine failure is a historical enigma diﬀ icult to decipher. What has hap-
pened to a nation that was one of the richest in the world at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, when fi fty years later a gradual decline, almost imperceptible, 
began, to be followed by a vertiginous spiral that led to collapse at the beginning 
of the twenty-fi rst century?
In these two fragments we can appreciate what I will call the narrative of 
decline: a drop that comes from afar and never stops; and a potential prog-
ress that never comes. But Sebreli adds a central element of this narrative: 
the question about the reasons for decline. In other words, how a country con-
demned to success (as President Duhalde asserted in March 2002) can fail 
irretrievably.
The emergence of this narrative can be dated at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century, with the idea of “Argentine failure” (Kozel, 2007), the loss of faith 
in a promising future. This involved a challenge to the idea of progress, as it 
had been envisioned by Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Juan Bautista Alberdi 
and Bartolomé Mitre in the second half of the nineteenth century. One of the 
best-known versions tells the story of a thriving, prosperous, wealthy country 
in the early twentieth century. This progressive time was the result of a civi-
lizing process that had begun in 1853, when Juan Manuel de Rosas (Governor 
of Buenos Aires in 1829-1832 and the Province of Buenos Aires in 1835-1852; 
“a tyrant” according to this perspective) was defeated in the battle of Caseros. 
Since then, the country would have experienced a time of progress thanks to 
European immigration, export of grain and meat, the development of railways, 
roads, ports, mail and telegraph, and secular and free education. This same 
perspective holds that in 1900 the income per capita of Argentina, Germany 
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and Canada was comparable;5 as a result, only seven countries in the world 
were wealthier than Argentina. In turn, this interpretation states that Argen-
tina lost this privileged position during the course of the twentieth century 
due to the “demagogic policies” of Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916-1922 and 1928-1930) 
and Juan Domingo Perón (1946-1955). These governments and others later 
with similar characteristics led Argentina to veer from the path of modernity, 
since the foundational liberal values were replaced by nationalist ideals (later, 
“populism”). Lawyer and journalist José Ignacio García Hamilton – an advocate 
of this version of history, often defi ned as “liberal” – wondered: “Why did we 
abandon the principles of modernity and the path that had been so successful? 
Are we condemned to decline and failure”? (García Hamilton, 2003, p. 58). Coin-
ciding with García Hamilton, doctor and journalist Nelson Castro (2003, p. 167) 
held that a “crisis of values” prevailed, in which a “culture of shortcut intended 
to supplant the compliance to the letter of the law”, a consequence of the con-
tinuous coups d’état and political messianism. For his part, accountant and 
university professor Pedro José Frías (2003, p. 179) considered that the reason 
for the decline was the “leisure civilization”, which had replaced the values of 
eﬀ ort and work, typical of immigrants from Europe in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. Leisure would have expanded due to Argentina’s own 
wealth due to its status as the “world’s barn”. He argued that populisms (such 
as Yrigoyenism and Peronism) convinced the working and middle classes that 
eﬀ ort was unnecessary, that welfare depended on the state.
The liberal version formed the basis from which other versions of decline 
were possible. The same temporal conception underlay a diﬀ erent assess-
ment of events. From a Peronist perspective, the decline began with the fall 
of Perón’s government in 1955. The presidential speeches of Adolfo Rodríguez 
Saá and Eduardo Duhalde before the Legislative Assemblies are a good exam-
ple, since both highlighted that the fi rst Peronism (1945-1955) was a time of 
“maximum well-being” for Argentines, a time that had to be recovered in order 
5 On this basis, many interpreters have asked insistently “how and why other nations with 
similar characteristics managed to progress, while Argentina was plunged into frustration and 
hopelessness” (Muchnik, 2003, p. 17), as journalist Daniel Muchnik argued about Canada and 
Australia. In turn, a year before the crisis, journalist Jorge Oviedo (2000) alluded to the rela-
tionship between the three countries through a metaphor of kinship: “three sisters who were 
separated after birth”.
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to return to the abandoned road. Rodríguez Saá proclaimed in December 23, 
2001: “[…] I believe in the ‘October 17’ of the people that gave Perón […] the 
opportunity to dignify the Argentines […] I believe in the Peronist resistance […]” 
(Diario…, 2001). For his part, Duhalde said in January 1, 2002:
I belong to a political movement that through former President Juan Domingo 
Perón and Eva Perón founded social justice in Argentina and raised the fl ags 
of economic independence and political sovereignty; fl ags that over time were 
assumed by all the political forces of popular origin. These fl ags have been low-
ered and today we have to ask ourselves and ask the Argentines if we really want 
to live in a sovereign and independent country. (Diario…, 2002).
For diﬀ erent reasons, some non-Peronist interpreters also pointed out that 
with the fall of Peronism a time of decline had begun. Historian Luis Alberto 
Romero (2003, p. 44) criticized the proscription of Peronism between 1955-1973 
since this had impacted negatively on the democratic imaginary. Likewise, 
decline could go back to the fi rst coup d’état in 1930 and, often, to the last mili-
tary dictatorship. If decline was thought to be the result of the abandonment of 
a virtuous path, the resolution of the current “crisis” would be a sort of regres-
sion, a substitution of the decadent time by another virtuous one or the return 
to a righteous past. The result would be the restitution of a progressive time.
The “adolescent nation” was another important narrative, although less 
invoked (González, 2014). According to conservative lawyer and journalist 
Mariano Grondona, Argentina was an immature country. Reminiscent of the 
Kantian interpretation of the Enlightenment and based on analogies with life 
cycles (Herman, 1997; Vigh, 2008), he saw Argentina as a nation that had not 
reached adulthood, a country that was constantly changing moods: “The teen-
ager expects too much from each change and therefore passes from illusion to 
frustration and from it to a new illusion. It is not necessary to renounce the 
utopia of a perfect tomorrow, but we should also reconcile with the modest 
reality […]” (Grondona, 2001a). This story resembles the narrative of decline, 
since both imagine a progressive future time. In a way, decline can also be seen 
as a very long liminal time, as the future restoration of progressive time con-
stitutes a promise that will be fulfi lled without fail. The time of the “adoles-
cent nation” also takes place in liminality (which admits oscillations, closer to 
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a cyclical time), but adulthood is a state that has not yet emerged; it can only 
be glimpsed through the contemplation of those who have reached adulthood, 
such as the developed, “serious” and “normal” countries.
Another narrative saw crises as a constant in Argentine history, a mani-
festation of repetitive cycles, a foreseeable event produced by a permanent 
alternation between fl ourishing and decadent times. In this narrative, the 
present becomes unfailingly unstable because the worst is always to come, as 
journalist and writer Rodrigo Fresán (2001) aﬀ irmed: “The Argentine condition 
is linked to the catastrophe”. The idea of crisis as an ever-emerging threat is 
deeply rooted among many social sectors. Like Grondona, much of the popula-
tion wonders “how and when the next crisis will break out?” (Grondona, 2001b). 
Possibly it is a reasonable way of seeing things if we consider that during the 
last fi fty or sixty years Argentines have experienced hyperinfl ations, devalua-
tions, recessions, confi scations, capital fl ight, fi scal defi cits, external debt, pro-
scriptions, political violence, coups d’état, authoritarianism and state terrorism. 
It is not surprising that during the “crisis” many people recalled other similar 
episodes in the past: the “crisis” was part of a sequence of past “crises”. Gron-
dona rightly defi ned crises as “the almost routine expression of a periodically 
convulsed country”; he even postulated a frequency: “Argentina remains faith-
ful to its custom, it explodes approximately every ten years” (Grondona, 2001b). 
In the same vein, political scientist Natalio Botana (2001) alleged: “Crises in 
Argentina constitute a relentless sequence. For many generations, normalcy is 
only an interval […] crisis is not an exceptional moment in the country’s march, 
but it imposes the historical seal of the longue durée”. In other words, what was 
happening was not exceptional: it had already happened before. Perhaps the 
“crisis” was a severe blow; but that did not mean that this was neither the fi rst 
nor the last stroke. Journalist Ignacio Escribano (2002) held that “the crisis 
was the mirror of a repeated history”.6 Concerning the underlying temporality 
of the narrative of recurring cycles, nobody could ever be sure that the present 
that turned into past will not return: the declining present ejected into the past 
will constitute a permanent threat. The inauguration of a new time should also 
6 The conception of time as “recurrent” is present in diverse interpretations of Argentine politi-
cal and economic history in the twentieth century (Cavarozzi, 1983; Cerro, 1999; Damill; Frenkel, 
1990; Damill, Frenkel; Juvenal, 2004; De Riz, 1984; Girón, 2009; Landi, 1979; Musacchio, 2009).
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be a prevention of the return of the fateful past. A permanent watch of the past 
will be indispensable; nobody will be able to relax because the substitution of 
a declining time for another prosperous one will be temporary: the past will 
always be a living force asleep and hidden in the present.7 As I will show in 
the following section, this narrative encompassed the rest, conditioning the 
imagination of possible futures.
Glimpsing the future in uncertain times
As I have pointed out, a consequence of crisis situations is, according to 
Lomnitz, the present saturation. Journalists like Susana Reinoso (2002) and 
Escribano (2002) refl ected this perception by means of expressions such as 
“precarious state”, the lack of “a fi rm fl oor under our feet”, the impossibility to 
anticipate or overcome an unbearable present, or the “total absence of a proj-
ect that helps us believe that tomorrow will exist”. In the same way, philoso-
pher Enrique Valiente Noailles (2002) lamented the uncertainty that “does not 
allow a minimal hope for the future”. In his view, the main problem lay in an 
intolerable and precarious present “conditioned by our perception of the future” 
without hope. A few days before the outbreak of December 19, psychologist Eva 
Giberti (2001) aﬀ irmed that if “the national project is violated, it is meaningless 
to create personal projects […] We need an experience of the future to develop 
projects”. Similarly, writer and journalist Rodolfo Rabanal (2001) denunciated 
“the total absence of a useful project to believe in tomorrow”.
The perception of time as frozen, stopped or in a state of suspension is dis-
tinctive of liminal instances; these are passages to a new state, which replaces 
the old one. In the major economic and political crises of contemporary capital-
ist societies, there are no pre-established ways (such as rituals) through which 
the passage or transition is processed, so the new state, the future, must be 
imagined (Visacovsky, 2017, p. 7-8). What is the raw material by which societies 
7 Armony and Armony (2005) identifi ed a narrative of the promise of a happy future, a country 
condemned to success (as Duhalde said during his presidency). However, this can be seen as 
a variant that postulates an imperative future, which could derive from any of the narratives 
presented here.
328
Horiz. antropol., Porto Alegre, ano 24, n. 52, p. 311-341, set./dez. 2018
Sergio E. Visacovsky
elaborate the future when it is unimaginable? In the Argentine case, one way 
to create the future was through the purifi cation of a present situation defi ned 
as “corrupt”. Interpreters as Bayer (2002b) considered that some actors could 
carry out the role of purifi ers, due to their unpolluted, incorruptible charac-
ter. These actors were: Madres and Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo (seen as sym-
bols of resistance to the last dictatorship since the democratic transition), the 
piqueteros,8 students, teachers and professors and eventually all humiliated 
and unemployed people. Bayer saw these actors as lighthouses to guide the 
people in the midst of the storm, or models to imitate, totally opposed to politi-
cians, judges, trade unionists and business owners that had led the Argentines 
to disaster. Claims for a clean justice could also be seen in terms of sanitiza-
tion. These involved the entire ideological and political spectrum and would 
very soon become a prominent part of the political agenda. Between 2002 
and 2003, numerous demonstrations of citizens demanded the resignation of 
the members of the National Supreme Court of Justice, not only because they 
were held responsible for the confi scation of bank deposits, but also because 
they had colluded with political power. In fact, several members resigned and, 
already under his presidency, Néstor Kirchner promoted a total renovation of 
the Supreme Court (Kapiszewski, 2006; Ruibal, 2008). The reopening of trials 
for crimes committed by the last dictatorship can be considered part of this 
process of purifi cation of justice, once the laws of Full Stop and Due Obedience 
(approved in 1986 and 1987 respectively and repealed by Congress in 1998) and 
the pardons decreed by President Menem between 1989-1990 were declared 
unconstitutional by the Congress (2003) and the Supreme Court (2005). Obvi-
ously, the initial demand of a sector of the citizenry to carry out a thorough 
purge of the political leadership was impracticable; see e.g. writer and jour-
nalist Antonio Caparrós (2002); and journalists Roberto Guareschi (2002) and 
Washington Uranga (2001). The reconstruction of the political system was con-
ducted by more or less known politicians, many of which had already played 
various roles in government for several years.
8 The piquetero movement had begun in the protests of unemployed workers in Neuquén in 1996, 
caused by the dismissal of workers from the state company Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales, 
which was privatized during Menem’s government; since then, their actions were character-
ized by the blockage of streets and routes (piquetes).
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If corruption was seen as a consequence of a “crisis of values”, of the lack 
of honesty and decency, how could these qualities be recovered? “A look at the 
decades after 1853 shows us that progress is possible, if we return to positive 
values”, according to García Hamilton (2003, p. 58). He was invoking the narra-
tive of decline and a liberal vision of national history, according to which the 
future would consist in a return to the successful path abandoned many years 
ago, a restoration of lost time. These values could be embodied by certain his-
torical fi gures with archetypal characteristics; or by the ancestors who came 
from Europe and progressed through hard work and sacrifi ce.
Others thought that Argentines should be more realistic in the future, 
because they are prone to living in a world of illusions. Terms such as “illusion” 
or “fi ction” were used to defi ne the support that broad sectors of society gave to 
convertibility after its repeal (see, e.g., economist Aldo Ferrer, 2001; journalist 
Marcelo Bonelli, 2001; engineer and economist Schvarzer, 2002, 2003; writer 
and journalist Tomás Eloy Martínez, 2005; journalist Martín Kanenguiser, 
2011). A propensity to illusion that, as I showed in the previous section, was 
typical of an “adolescent nation” that had to reach maturity.
Now, we have seen that one of the peculiarities of the interpretations of 
Argentine history is that prosperous times are ephemeral. According to certain 
perspectives, the path of progress cannot be retrieved or, in other words, adult-
hood cannot be achieved due to the action of retrograde forces. Certainly, the 
restoration of progress or the passage to maturity are absorbed by a narrative 
in which cyclical temporality prevails. When history is interpreted in this way, 
the resolution of every crisis supposes the avoidance of a return of the ill-fated 
past, through either its eternal vigilance or, as Néstor Kirchner expounded in 
the Legislative Assembly on May 25, 2003, a defi nitive break in the cyclical 
logic. During and after the “crisis”, the fear of an upcoming “crisis” has had per-
formative eﬀ ects in practices related to savings and investment, but it has also 
played a key role in the political contest. “If we lose, the country will return to 
2001,” Néstor Kirchner said before the 2009 legislative elections (Verón, 2009). 
A few years later, in a context of infl ation and an increase in social confl ict, 
sociologist Manuel Mora y Araujo warned about the possibility of a new “crisis” 
in Argentina (Dutra, 2013).
In turn, the idea of a cyclical temporality allowed for the imagination of the 
future as the end of a cycle and the beginning of a new one. This was sustained 
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by interpreters that were critical of the 1990s, such as political scientist and 
sociologist Atilio Borón (2001) and Aldo Ferrer (2001); according to them, the 
fall of de la Rúa’s government was the expiration of a neoliberal cycle, which 
had begun with the conclusion of the government of Isabel Perón and the poli-
cies of the minister of economy of the last military dictatorship, José Alfredo 
Martínez de Hoz. The cycle took the form of a genealogy, which established a 
relationship of descent between certain ideologies, governments, policies and 
characters of the present and their origins in the past. Thus, state terrorism 
and the economic policies of the last dictatorship was the genealogical origin 
of 1990s’ neoliberalism.
The condemnation of neoliberalism aﬀ ected government oﬀ icials who 
planned and implemented the policies and politicians, economists, and 
journalists who defended them. Almost a year before the events of Decem-
ber, Muchnik (2001) did not hesitate to ask: “Did [the ministers of economy] 
Domingo Cavallo, Roque Fernández, José Luis Machinea, Ricardo López Mur-
phy, [and neoliberal academic centers] CEMA, FIEL, Fundación Mediterránea 
and other factories and hotbeds of government oﬀ icials have nothing to do 
with what is happening?”. He remembered that they had sold public enter-
prises, tripled the external debt, destroyed labor laws, and expanded poverty. 
He argued: “They should be held accountable for what they did”.9 The genea-
logical relationship that linked the last dictatorship with the 1990s was a way 
to identify the agents of pollution.
In contrast, a clean genealogy could face the task of future purifi cation, 
such as imagining economic policies completely diﬀ erent from neoliberal 
ones. The so-called “Plan Fénix” is a good example of this. It was drawn up a 
few months before December 2001 by a group of economists at the University 
of Buenos Aires. The project, inspired by Keynes’ ideas, postulated the central 
role of the state in order to boost economic growth, promote employment and 
consumption recovery and a more equitable distribution of income by devel-
oping import substitution industrialization and introducing dollar exchange 
controls. These economic ideas would be leading in the following years.
9 Voices identifi ed as “neoliberal” were rarely heard on the public stage. A notable exception was 
Álvaro Alsogaray (2002), former economy minister in the government of Arturo Frondizi and de 
facto President José María Guido and advisor to President Menem.
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The various narratives are related hierarchically. Depending on their 
underlying temporalities, one narrative (or parts of it) can be transformed into 
another. The sequence progress-decline-progress very easily becomes a narra-
tive of recurrent cycles. The narrative of an adolescent nation can be likened 
to the conception of decline, when the future of adulthood and progress is not 
achieved. In all cases, the narrative of recurrent cycles subsumes all the other 
narratives, transforming all progress, well-being and maturity into something 
transitory.
Conclusions
During the time coined as a “crisis” in Argentina a large number of public 
interpreters tried to explain its causes and possible solutions. Peculiarly, all 
these interpretations placed the “crisis” in national history. On the one hand, 
this was the appropriate frame to make the current time intelligible; on the 
other, the situation triggered a wide-ranging historical refl ection on the mis-
fortunes and destiny of the nation. Although this situation demanded imme-
diate responses, the interpretations showed that a broad conviction existed: 
the evils that had led to the “crisis” were not a product of the present. These 
interpretations held that the overcoming of this corrupt time demanded an 
urgent political and moral purifi cation. But, at the same time, the “crisis” was 
seen as crystallization of a repeated history of letdowns. Interpreters appealed 
to a series of narrative frames (Knight, 2012a, p. 356) that conceived the “crisis” 
as an expression of the “Argentine decline”, as a new oscillation in the mood 
of an “adolescent nation”, or, lastly, as part of “the recurrent cycles” in which 
prosperity and decay alternated. The unthinkable future after the “crisis” could 
be imagined through narratives. In all cases, the future presupposed the insti-
tution of a progressive time, but each narrative solved it in a diﬀ erent way. The 
narrative of decline demanded a return or restitution of a fl ourishing past; 
the narrative of the adolescent nation, called for the achievement of a state of 
maturity; and the narrative of recurrent cycles, required the defi nitive stoppage 
of the eternal recurrence. Although each narrative was autonomous, the nar-
rative of the recurrent cycles has been dominant, transforming all the others. 
I do not claim that these narratives represent all interpretations of the time 
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of “crisis”. I have focused on public interpretations, but others could be thought 
of and spread by popular sectors, for example. However, many of these pub-
lic interpretations had consequences in the practices and everyday life of the 
population, since they gave rise to specifi c policies.
I would like to highlight three reasons why it is important to study public 
interpretations of the “crisis”. First, the “crisis” revealed (Knight, 2012a, p. 369) 
deep-rooted ways of imagining the nation and a sense of historicity; a pres-
ent embedded in national history, with its specifi c interpretations and, conse-
quently, potential solutions or projects. The past (or its narratives) constituted 
models through which the nation could be thought (Sahlins, 1985). Second, 
the interpretative disputes about the time of “crisis” forged specifi c meanings 
of the event. It is clear that widespread corruption and neoliberal economic 
policies were preponderant aspects that had led to disaster (without euphe-
misms). This was expressed by public interpretations of the “crisis”. However, 
many of these interpretations did something else: they postulated the need 
for a specifi c type of political intervention (Hay, 1996). For that reason the exit 
of the “crisis” implied a diﬀ erent path from the neoliberal one. In short, the 
nomination of a time as “crisis” is inseparable from its interpretations, from 
the imaginable futures and from certain and new courses of political action 
(Bryant, 2016, p. 26). Third, the exit from the “crisis” allows us to understand 
the political and economic process that follows. This seems like a truism, but 
I mean something a little less obvious. I suggest that the interpretative dis-
putes that constituted the “crisis” as an event produced a political setting in 
which certain actions were possible and admissible, to the detriment of others. 
The strong public condemnation of the policies of the 1990s and their lead-
ers enabled forms of intervention that were presented as opposed. Taking into 
account Duhalde’s government and the fi rst years of Kirchner’s, we see that 
the economic policy was more state-oriented; diﬀ erent programs to address 
poverty and unemployment were implemented; or the trials of those respon-
sible for state terrorism were reopened. I conjecture that, perhaps, the same 
can be applied to other aspects of “Kirchnerism” (a local term that is often used 
uncritically to refer to diﬀ erent times and policies), such as its invocations to 
certain pasts seen as exemplary and the construction of genealogies, the rela-
tionship with a “recovery of the political” or the return of the “participation of 
youth in politics”.
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Finally, this article aims to be a contribution to the novel fi eld of studies 
on crisis situations, especially in anthropology. These can help understand 
aspects not covered by macroeconomic or political analyses. From a non-
normative perspective, based on empirical research and an analytical arsenal 
sensitive to the native’s perspectives, these investigations show how each 
crisis is specifi c, because its interpretation is only possible within particular 
frames and historicities. Crises (in an economic sense) may obey the universal 
logic of capitalism; but the Argentine “crisis” is a multidimensional event only 
intelligible within a specifi c sense of historicity. Like the studies on Spain and 
(mainly) Greece, the Argentine case highlights the relevance of cultural dimen-
sions to understand the collective responses that each country has assumed as 
a national project.
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